Skip to main content

People v. Torres: Transporting and Possessing Alcohol in Prison are Two Separate Criminal Acts


In People v. Torres, the Second Appellate District determined the acts of bringing alcohol into a jail facility and possessing alcohol in a jail facility are two separate punishable crimes that each have its own objective.

Alfonso Torres and Adan Barajas were two inmates at a minimum security prison fire camp who snuck alcohol into the facility with the help from a civilian. A correctional officer saw a car drive onto the facility making a stop at a trash can. The driver got out of the car and placed two trash bags in the trash can. The civilian quickly drove off while honking several times. Moments later, Torres and Barajas ran to the trash can, picked up the trash bags, and ran back to a nearby building.

To prove that Torres and Barajas “knowingly” brought alcohol onto the jail’s facility, the court explained several circumstances that showed they were fully aware of the crime they committed. A civilian cooperated with the defendants to successfully transport the contraband onto the jail’s facility. The trash can was a predetermined location for the civilian to inconspicuously drop off the items using trash bags. Upon driving off the premises, the civilian honked, issuing a signal to the defendants to grab the trash bags before a garbage man or a correctional officer could get a hold of it. Moreover, Barajas was heard saying “Which one is mine”, showing that he already knew what the bag contained. 

Although Torres argued that Penal Code §654 “precludes that no act or omission be punished under more than one provision”, the court explained that there were two separate objectives that distinguish two crimes had occurred. The first crime was completed when the alcohol was transported onto the prison camp. The objective shifted to possession when Torres and Barajas took the trash bags.

The Second Appellate District affirmed judgment on Torres and Barajas’s convictions, holding that there were two crimes that were committed and sentencing them for each crime.

-California Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate District, 2nd Div., August 15, 2011; B226903

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Ecstasy qualifies as a controlled substance under Health & Safety Code section 11377

The California 4th District Court of Appeal held that because Ecstasy contains methamphetamine, it qualifies as a controlled substance or an analog to a controlled substance for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11377. In this case, Appellant was convicted of possession of Ecstasy. He argued insufficient evidence supported the conviction because the drug is neither a controlled substance, nor an analog of any controlled substance for purposes of the statute. Section 11377 prohibits possession of controlled substances which are specified in several other statutes. Ecstasy, also known as MDMA or methyldioxy methamphetamine, is not listed in any of these statutes. But, one of the statutes enumerated in section 11377, namely section 11055, subdivision (d), includes, inter alia, "stimulants" containing any quantity of methamphetamine. In this case, the officer testified Ecstasy includes methamphetamine and has a stimulating effect similar to it. Based on this testimony, t...
Post a Comment
Read more

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more