Skip to main content

Implied Malice Theory

In People v. Canizalez, the Second Appellate District affirmed judgment on the convictions for Robert Canizalez and Martin Morones. On a busy city street, the two defendants engaged in a street drag race that ended in a collision with another car. The other car immediately burst into flames, killing the occupants, whom were a mother and her two young children.


Both Canizalez and Morones appealed, believing there was an insufficient amount of evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument for implied malice. The defendants argued that the elements of the incident did not prove they were aware of the danger involved in their actions and it also did not show they were lacking a conscious regard for life. The court of appeals disagreed, and affirmed judgment from the lower court.

Contrary to the defendants’ argument for appeal, the court of appeals provided an overwhelming amount of evidence that supported the implied malice theory. For instance, Canizalez and Morones were well aware of the danger from racing in the streets because they are long time residents of the neighborhood where the incident occurred and are familiar with its traffic conditions. Hours before the collision, witnesses saw Canizalez driving recklessly in the neighborhood, speeding and making sharp U-turns. Both defendants have participated in street drag racing and have adapted their cars to engage in that type of car racing. Moreover, they tried to eliminate evidence that showed they were involved in the crash by pushing one of the cars away and quickly leaving the scene. Canizalez and Morones did not attempt to help the victims or even inquire about their condition. With these given facts, the court of appeals found their actions to be in support of the implied malice theory, rejecting the defendant’s argument.

-California Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate District, 2nd Div., July 20,2011; B218515

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

California Supreme Court Narrows Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement

On November 25, 2019, the California Supreme Court overturned a 17-year-old exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. People v. Lopez holds “that the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” People v. Lopez , No. S238627, 2019 WL 6267367, at *1 (Cal. Nov. 25, 2019). Before Lopez , police were “allowed … to conduct warrantless vehicle searches for personal identification documents at traffic stops when the driver failed to provide … personal identification upon request.” Id . The Court summarized the facts of Lopez as follows: police “responded to an anonymous tip concerning erratic driving.” Police were “(u)nable to locate the vehicle,” so they “asked dispatch to run a computer search of the license plate.” Police “then drove by the address where the car was registered,” but didn’t see a car matching the description. As such, p...
Post a Comment
Read more