Skip to main content

A delusional mental state is not enough for an unreasonable self-defense claim to 1st degree murder

Last week the Supreme Court of California ruled on whether a defendant can bring an “unreasonable self-defense” claim based on his delusional mental state at the time of the murder. In People v. Elmore the Court refused to give the jury an instruction of voluntary manslaughter based on an imperfect self-defense. The California Supreme Court Majority stated that, “California cases reflect the understanding that unreasonable self-defense involves a misperception of objective circumstances, not a reaction produced by mental disturbance alone.” The majority went on to give a definition between misperception and a delusion: “A delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances. The line between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective correlate.” In the instant case, the court concluded that the defendant Elmore was acting on a delusion devoid of any correlating facts when he attacked the victim.

The facts of the case were as follows: Defendant Elmore was mentally ill and diagnosed with schizophrenia; on several previous occasions the defendant had been diagnosed as psychotic and hospitalized. The defendant was living in a rehabilitation center and on the day of the murder. The defendant was visiting family when he began to act “fidgety and anxious.” The defendant ran away from his family members and was seen attacking the victim, Ella Suggs, whom he stabbed with a sharpened paint brush handle resulting in her death. The defendant grabbed the victim’s necklace before running away. At trial the defendant gave confusing testimony about the event and about what he remembered.  He claimed part of the events of that day he had blacked out and did not remember who --  but knew someone --  threatened him. At trial the defendant wanted an instruction to be given to the jury of unreasonable self defense based on his delusions. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. At sentencing, he withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and was sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to the instruction and the conviction of 1st degree murder must stand. The court reasoned that the defense did not present any evidence that Elmore acted on some misperception of fact in defending himself from a threat, but rather, was delusional about the threat.  


Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Ecstasy qualifies as a controlled substance under Health & Safety Code section 11377

The California 4th District Court of Appeal held that because Ecstasy contains methamphetamine, it qualifies as a controlled substance or an analog to a controlled substance for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11377. In this case, Appellant was convicted of possession of Ecstasy. He argued insufficient evidence supported the conviction because the drug is neither a controlled substance, nor an analog of any controlled substance for purposes of the statute. Section 11377 prohibits possession of controlled substances which are specified in several other statutes. Ecstasy, also known as MDMA or methyldioxy methamphetamine, is not listed in any of these statutes. But, one of the statutes enumerated in section 11377, namely section 11055, subdivision (d), includes, inter alia, "stimulants" containing any quantity of methamphetamine. In this case, the officer testified Ecstasy includes methamphetamine and has a stimulating effect similar to it. Based on this testimony, t...
Post a Comment
Read more

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more