Skip to main content

United States v. Underwood: deficient search warrant

United States appealed the granting of defendant’s motion to suppress which was granted due to bare bones, cut and paste facts in a search warrant affidavit. Underwood was charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
•The Ninth Circuit held that:
–Conclusions of affiant unsupported by underlying facts can’t be used to establish probable cause
–The affidavit contained only two facts, foundationless expert opinion, and conclusory allegations
•Seen baggie of personal use marijuana lacked a nexus to ecstasy trafficking
•Observation of Defendant delivering two wooden crates to suspected dealers three months before warrant wasn’t detailed enough; was a bare conclusion that it contained ecstasy
•Affidavit failed to define “drug trafficker” and provided no facts to support conclusion that Underwood is in business of buying & selling ecstasy
•LAPD Officer’s statement that a federal warrant had previously issued in the case for a different residence didn’t add any indicia of probable cause to the state affidavit (neither warrant nor affidavit were attached).
•“Leon” good faith exception doesn’t apply because the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”
–“The affidavit reasonable supports only the following innocent conclusions: Underwood knows Luong and Barrera; he helped [them] move crates on one occasion; and Underwood possibly uses marijuana.”

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Ecstasy qualifies as a controlled substance under Health & Safety Code section 11377

The California 4th District Court of Appeal held that because Ecstasy contains methamphetamine, it qualifies as a controlled substance or an analog to a controlled substance for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11377. In this case, Appellant was convicted of possession of Ecstasy. He argued insufficient evidence supported the conviction because the drug is neither a controlled substance, nor an analog of any controlled substance for purposes of the statute. Section 11377 prohibits possession of controlled substances which are specified in several other statutes. Ecstasy, also known as MDMA or methyldioxy methamphetamine, is not listed in any of these statutes. But, one of the statutes enumerated in section 11377, namely section 11055, subdivision (d), includes, inter alia, "stimulants" containing any quantity of methamphetamine. In this case, the officer testified Ecstasy includes methamphetamine and has a stimulating effect similar to it. Based on this testimony, t...
Post a Comment
Read more

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more