Skip to main content

Grand Jury Subpoenas for Documents of a Public Investigation Enforceable

The Ninth Circuit Court reversed an order in the district court. The Ninth Circuit held that grand jury subpoenas for documents were enforceable where they came within subpoena power through litigation initiated after the grand jury investigation became public.

The government conducted an anti-trust investigation into alleged criminal conduct that became public. Private lawsuits were filed against the companies under investigation. These lawsuits were consolidated in district court into one case. During that litigation discovery produced defendants' documents that originated from outside of the United States. Several domestic law firms representing the defendant companies possessed the documents and were subpoenaed by the grand jury in the government investigation. The law firms moved to quash the subpoenas. The district court agreed, finding novel issues with the implications for grand-jury power and for the relationship between grand-jury proceedings and civil discovery of foreign defendants that were not indicted.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that grand jury subpoenas could be enforced. The court noted that the law firms did not establish or suggest any collusion between their clients and the government. The law firms also did not claim that the documents were privileged. The court applied its per se rule that a grand jury subpoena takes precedence over a civil protective order pursuant to (I) In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes (I), 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995).

This case is: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas; 9th Cir. December 7, 2010; 10-15758.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Ecstasy qualifies as a controlled substance under Health & Safety Code section 11377

The California 4th District Court of Appeal held that because Ecstasy contains methamphetamine, it qualifies as a controlled substance or an analog to a controlled substance for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11377. In this case, Appellant was convicted of possession of Ecstasy. He argued insufficient evidence supported the conviction because the drug is neither a controlled substance, nor an analog of any controlled substance for purposes of the statute. Section 11377 prohibits possession of controlled substances which are specified in several other statutes. Ecstasy, also known as MDMA or methyldioxy methamphetamine, is not listed in any of these statutes. But, one of the statutes enumerated in section 11377, namely section 11055, subdivision (d), includes, inter alia, "stimulants" containing any quantity of methamphetamine. In this case, the officer testified Ecstasy includes methamphetamine and has a stimulating effect similar to it. Based on this testimony, t...
Post a Comment
Read more

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more