Skip to main content

Bellante v. Superior Court: Burden of Delay Shifts to the Prosecution

The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Kern County held that Matthew Bellante, who was cited for drunk driving in July of 2008 but never received notice to appear, had the better argument in a rare instance against the People.

Bellante was cited for drunk driving July 11, 2008, after which a complaint was filed on the 28th and a warrant issued August 6th. Bellante's address was verified on his driver's license at the time of the citation and in DMV records. Bellante was not served but learned of the warrant through the DMV and turned himself in.

Over a year later, December 17, 2009, Bellante moved to dismiss his case for lack of a speedy trial, arguing that he had resided at his given address openly and continuously since 2003, in the time since his citation no effort was made to serve him with the warrant and that he had not failed to appear. Bellante cited Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239 (Serna), which established that the delay of over one year from the filing of the complaint in this misdemeanor case results in presumptive prejudice. Additionally, the California Supreme Court recently cited Serna and stated that Barker is the final step in a three-tiered approach that first requires the defense to demonstrate prejudice from a delay of trial followed by the prosecution, and finally "the trial court must balance the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay against the prosecution's justification for the delay" [(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 (Barker); (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 942)].

The Court decided that this complaint triggered application of the weighing process outlined in Barker, which made it the duty of the People to show justification for the delay of trial and that they exercised reasonable diligence in bringing Bellante to trial. A writ of mandate was issued in favor of Bellante directing the trial court to vacate its order denying dismissal of the case and enter a new order of dismissal.

This case is: Bellante v. Superior Court S-1500-AP-721.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Second Circuit Holds that Personal Benefit is Not Required for Insider Trading

Insider trading, or “ securities fraud ,” is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks v. SEC , someone engages in insider trading under §10(b) if they breach a fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Blaszczak rejected this personal benefit requirement, at least as it relates to § 1348. The result? The range of conduct that triggers criminal liability under § 1348 is far bigger than the range of conduct that triggers liability under § 10(b). Stated another way, Blaszczak makes it easier for federal prosecutors to go after Title 18 securities fraud because - unlike Title 15 securities fraud - they do no need to prove the existence of a personal benefit.
Post a Comment
Read more

U.S. Supreme Court Eases Rules for Miranda Warning

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer . Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, which six other Justices joined in full. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. The Court held that a fourteen-day break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards v. Arizona rule which states that once a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary and is the result of coercion. In reversing the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Shatzer’s return to his normal pre-interrogation life in the general prison population for a period of two-and-one-half years before re-interrogation constituted a sufficient break in custody enable him to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Edwards case did not require that Shatzer’s re-interrogation statements be suppressed, and the Court remanded the case ...
Post a Comment
Read more

California Supreme Court Narrows Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement

On November 25, 2019, the California Supreme Court overturned a 17-year-old exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. People v. Lopez holds “that the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” People v. Lopez , No. S238627, 2019 WL 6267367, at *1 (Cal. Nov. 25, 2019). Before Lopez , police were “allowed … to conduct warrantless vehicle searches for personal identification documents at traffic stops when the driver failed to provide … personal identification upon request.” Id . The Court summarized the facts of Lopez as follows: police “responded to an anonymous tip concerning erratic driving.” Police were “(u)nable to locate the vehicle,” so they “asked dispatch to run a computer search of the license plate.” Police “then drove by the address where the car was registered,” but didn’t see a car matching the description. As such, p...
Post a Comment
Read more